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Abstract 
During the last twenty years many traditionally organized agricultural cooperatives have faced 
problems that have forced them to abandon their business form. Why is it so? Theoretical 
explanations have been put forward, comprising a variety of economic and sociological 
theories. The present study suggests that the social capital paradigm may add significant 
explanatory power when analyzing this development. Our claim is  that the problems are due 
to the members having less and less trust in the cooperatives and in each other. The 
cooperatives’ decision-makers have no instruments for estimating how much social capital is 
lost when they pursue strategies of vertical and horizontal integration, and therefore they do 
not consider this loss in their calculations. Thus the problems caused by the cooperatives’ 
vaguely defined property rights are becoming increasingly serious. This reasoning is 
summarized into a number of models, which are influenced by the consumer choice model.  
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1. Introduction  
 
During the last two decades many traditionally organized agricultural cooperatives in the 
western economies have undergone profound changes (Fulton and Hueth, 2009). Some have 
transformed into a non-traditional cooperative organizational model, for example by 
introducing individual ownership by the members (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007). Others have 
disappeared due to mergers or acquisitions (Chaddad and Cook, 2007; van der Krogt, Nilsson 
and Høst, 2007). A number of bankruptcies have taken place (Lang, 2006). Some 
cooperatives have sold a part of their business activities to investors, thus getting a hybrid 
type of cooperative (Corporate …, 2000; van Bekkum and Bijman, 2006). Still others have 
converted into investor-owned firms (IOFs). What can explain these changes in business 
forms? 
 
In their attempts to explain the problems of many agricultural cooperatives, researchers have 
used a wide specter of theories such as agency theory (Cook, 1995), property rights theory 
(Fulton, 1995), population ecology theory (Bager, 1996), transaction cost theory (Harte, 
1997), corporate governance theory (Holmström, 1999), and cultural theory (Hogeland, 
2006).  
 
This study suggests social capital theory as a tool for explaining the demise of many 
agricultural cooperatives. It is posited that the cooperatives are gradually losing social capital, 
that is, network resources not visible to the eye but which nevertheless have visible, economic 
impact on these enterprises. We argue that drain of social capital is reflected in less 
engagement for mutual benefits, less cooperation as well as members’ decreasing trust in  
their cooperatives, their leaders, as well as in each other. 
 
This is not an entirely new story. When reviewing the literature, we find fragmented elements 
of social capital theory in several of the prior explanations. Hence the purpose of this study is 
to provide an overall and coherent social capital framework for understanding more fully why 
traditional cooperatives often suffer from problems in the present-day market environments. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents basic social capital theory. Section 3 
deals with social capital in cooperatives and explains why social capital should be taken 
seriously into account by cooperative decision-makers, in line with more traditional forms of 
capital as financial and human capital. On the background of a literature review, Section 4 
points at a gap in literature, namely the problem of social capital drain in cooperative firms 
formerly rich on social capital – a phenomenon that until now has been largely non-
conceptualized (social relations regarded as a veritable capital) and therefore ignored by 
cooperative decision-makers. The problem is then illustrated in a number of models. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
  
 
2. Social capital 
 
We will in the following focus on the trust, collective action and reputational effects as 
important dimensions of social capital in cooperatives.  
2.1. The trust dimension 
What is social capital? Putnam (2000:19) defines social capital as consisting of “social 
networks [among individuals] and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
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them. He further explains that “Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education 
(human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social 
contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups”. 
 
Trust is an indicator of social capital. If two persons, or a group of people, trust each other and 
in fact can trust each other, it will be easier for them to engage in productive collaboration as 
this will be characterized by low transaction costs. Thus, to trust is to accept vulnerability 
because you are never sure whether the other can be trusted, or whether the partner will abuse 
your trust. In this sense, vulnerability is the “price of trust” (Barbalet 2009: 369), implying 
potential economic, social and emotional costs. 
 
However, it is important to note that supra-individual factors impact trust. In a rational choice 
perspective, risks of being hurt are conditional to peoples’ daily life experiences, including 
personal acquaintance as well as the risks of sanctions the cheater or free-rider is running, 
either in the form of social sanctions or more formal sanctioning from the state or the 
organization, at the meso and macro levels (e.g. the cooperative enterprise) (cf. Coleman 
1988; Hardin 1993; Newton 2007; Rothstein 2009:200ff.).  
2.2. Solution to collective action problems 
It is however a simplification when Huck (1998:55) states that it is only when costs from 
sanctions exceed profits from cheating that “trustworthiness pays off” (Huck 1998:55). Thus 
findings on collective action within behavioral and evolutionary game theory shows that 
narrow self-interest is modified by social motivations and history (repeated games). Besides 
there is, in general, more willingness to cooperate in one-shot games where the trustor has 
very little, or no, information about the trustee than was previously assumed in first 
generation collective action theories (Ostrom & Ahn 2009: 19-20). Without leaving the 
rational actor model entirely, second generation collective action theories have therefore 
acknowledged the existence of “multiple types of individuals” with “intrinsic values” (not 
only the average rational actor) (op.cit.:21), and cooperative outcomes are influenced by 
individual personalities and interests, social networks, trust as well as formal and actually 
applied rules, including the possibility of social sanctioning (Ostrom & Ahn 2009).  
 
These underlying norms of reciprocity and trust within a group or firm, and the concomitant 
rules to ensure them, have often been summarized as a social capital (Coleman 1988; Ostrom 
& Ahn 2009). This form of capital contributes to solve collective action problems, i.e. 
mediates the conflict between private and collective interests, including solving the free-rider 
problem. Besides, social capital strengthens the other forms of capital within the group 
(physical, financial, human) in a multiplicator effect.4  
 
That trust matters in cooperatives is evident due to the fact that members own the cooperative, 
invest money in it for the benefit of coming members (whom they do not know) and accept 
that the cooperative also has non-profit purposes. It is of course a truism to say that a 
cooperative relies on members’ cooperative skills and norms implying widespread trust 
within the organization. Nevertheless, this is evidently often forgotten in theory as well as in 
practical decision processes. As a consequence, valuable social capital that may have served 
as an important tool in solving collective action problems is lost.  
 
                                                 
4 , it has been argued that trust behavior is influenced by cultural norms (e.g. Uslaner, 2002), the way children 
are socialized (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2007) and religion (e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000; Delhey and Newton, 2005). 
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2.3. Reputational effects 
For a business firm to be able to conduct various activities there is a need for financial capital, 
but also for social capital (and human, physical, etc.). In this paper only financial and social 
capital are considered. To the extent that the firm enjoys social capital, the business partners 
are likely to comply with the agreements, trusting rather than spending time and energy on 
expensive control such as formal contracts, and thereby transaction costs are reduced. Social 
capital within the staff will mean that the work is better coordinated and that there will be 
fewer free-riders. Instead employees, further motivated by ownership and an institutional set-
up that secures democratic governance, will work for mutual benefits instead of solely 
looking for their own narrow individual or (sub-)group interests. If the customers have trust in 
the firm, they are willing to pay a higher price and buy larger volumes. In case the capital 
market has a positive view of the firm, more investors are interested and they are willing to 
buy more stock and so at a higher price, and lend more money on terms that are better for the 
firm. A firm with a good reputation is likely to attract more qualified staff.  
 
3. Social capital in cooperatives 
3.1. What is a cooperative, and why have cooperatives been established? 
The number of definitions of cooperatives is large (e.g. Phillips, 1953; Calvert. 1959; ILO, 
1965; Münkner, 1974; Roy, 1981; Centner, 1988). Even though none of these definitions 
explicitly state the concept of social capital, they all comprise expressions, which indicate that 
cooperatives are based on the existence of social capital.  
 
The most widespread definition of cooperatives is: “A cooperative is a user-owned and user-
controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis of use” (Barton, 1989, p. 1). The three 
components of this definition indicate that cooperatives are linked to the concept of social 
capital. The aim of a cooperative is not to convey capital gains to any owners; it is to create 
benefits to a group of members. These benefits should not be distributed in proportion to the 
amount of ownership but in relation to the members’ patronage. Hence cooperatives are 
owned by the patrons for the sake of achieving some benefits. Furthermore cooperatives are 
democratically controlled. The ownership, the distribution of benefits and the control all 
indicate social relationships between the cooperative and the members as well a between the 
members. The members are persons of flesh and blood who run their own agricultural 
enterprises. They are not anonymous financiers.  
 
Practically all cooperatives started in a small scale. There were a small number of founders, 
most often all living in the same village or another small geographical area. The founders 
were neighbors and colleagues, and sometimes also relatives. The task of establishing a 
jointly owned firm was a risky one as everybody thereby would be dependent upon each 
other. If one or a few of the members were shirking, the entire membership would suffer. 
Therefore trust within the membership was needed, i.e. the level of social capital necessarily 
had to be high to overcome social action dilemmas. The members were also willing to accept 
a high degree of social control.  
 
The early members had to finance the newly established cooperative but they were normally 
not willing to invest a larger amount than was absolutely necessary. For this reason members, 
especially in the old days, accepted personal liability for the cooperatives’ debts, and this is 
why cooperatives have often had low leverage.  
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The cooperative was established in order to adjust a malfunctioning market mechanism, 
which is to say that the members through their cooperative could reduce the risk-taking in 
their farm enterprises. Hence, they were not willing to accept large risks within the 
cooperative enterprise, and so the financial investments were small. Furthermore, the 
members needed all the capital they could get for investments in their own farm operations. 
Cooperatives are generally considered to be risk averse (Hendrikse, 1998) just as the members 
are risk averse in relation to the cooperatives while their view on risks within their own 
farming operations are reasonably the same as other small businessmen. 
 
3.2. Multiplicator effect, local embeddedness and formal institutions  
In order to run its business operations, a cooperative needs financial capital. It has to invest in 
plants, machinery, vehicles, product development, marketing and lots of other assets. The 
financial capital is, however, built up on the basis of social capital – a sort of ‘master capital’ 
which reinforces the other more tangible forms of capital (physical, financial, human). Seen 
from this perspective, the resource base of cooperatives is the social capital that the members 
have in the cooperatives. All the financial capital that a cooperative has originates in one way 
or another from the members, often as they have abstained from some patronage refunds, and 
they have done so voluntarily. The financial capital is hence a kind of conversion of social 
capital – or the result of a ‘multiplicator effect’ – in the sense that members have been willing 
to supply the cooperative with financial capital. To the extent that the social capital is lacking, 
also the financial capital will suffer, as will human capital (lack of mutual trust leading to lack 
of interaction and communication). Even though many of today’s cooperatives are large and 
have a large amount of equity capital, the social capital basis still holds.  
 
The social capital within cooperatives is also seen in the fact that cooperatives are operating 
within a specific region, namely the region where the members are farming. The sales market 
may be anywhere in the world, but there are always strong connections with the members as 
concerns the collection of agricultural products. A similar connectedness concerns choice of 
industry. A dairy cooperative, for example, works with the processing and marketing of milk 
or milk-related products, and the raw milk is collected from farmer-members within the 
cooperative’s operating area.  
 
The governance of a cooperative is characterised by social capital as well. The directors are 
members, elected by the membership whereby each member has equal voting rights (one 
member, one vote), and the directors are members. Even the chairman is a farmer-member. 
As it comes to the professional leadership, the CEO and the rest of the management team are 
today recruited from the labor market, but historically (when the cooperatives were still small) 
one of the members often had the responsibility to take care of the business operations, or the 
son or another relative to one of the members could function in that position. Up till fairly 
recently it was considered desirable that the CEO should at least have a background in the 
agricultural sector.  
 
In principle, today’s agricultural cooperative is still run by the members on the basis of their 
wish to get benefits from the cooperative. Again, social capital is the point of departure of the 
governance of cooperatives. Hence, we argue that maintenance and further accumulation of 
social capital is the most effective solution to solve collective action problems that threaten to 
kill such organizations. Not least, this is the case in large cooperative firms where regular face 
to face contact, personal knowledge and trust between farmer-members, and between farmer-
members and leaders, tend to wither if – besides human, physical and financial capital – a 
social capital is not acknowledged, valued, maintained and further cultivated. 
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An important framework for accumulating social capital in cooperative firms are the formal 
institutions, i.e., the written down ‘rules of the game’. There are different sets of cooperative 
principles, such as the Rochdale principles, the Raifeissen principles and the Schultze-
Delitsch principles (Barton, 1989). No matter which set of principles is referred to these 
contain a clearly discernable element of ideology, even though these principles can also be 
argued to have an economic rationale (Nilsson, 1989). Likewise it is quite common that 
people refer to various sets of cooperative values (Craig, 1993; Hakelius, 1996). Both the 
principles and the values indicate that cooperatives are based on social capital. Many of the 
principles are socially attractive such as the principles of equal treatment and equal voting 
power.  
 
3.3. The importance of social capital in coops compared to IOFs  
To get a more clear picture of the particular importance of social capital in coops, one may 
compare with an investor-owned firm (IOF). Here the stockowners have invested money in 
order to get capital returns. Hence an IOF could work within any type of industry and in any 
region or country. For the stockholders it does not matter whether the firm works in one 
industry or another and in one country or another, as long as the capital returns are 
satisfactory. The stockholders of a large corporation with the stock listed at a stock exchange 
are anonymous to one other. There are no social connections, no personal acquaintance and, 
as often, no trust. Even at higher echelons of the organisational chart the relationships are 
“cold”. The board is elected by a general assembly but the voting is differentiated in relation 
to how much stock the stockowners have, i.e. financial capital logic. In many corporations 
there are a few stockowners with a dominating share of the stock. This group is in control of 
the firm but it has to consider the minority of stockholders to the extent that the minority may 
influence the value of the stock. The criterion for the election of directors and chairman and 
for the appointment of a CEO and other managers is the candidates’ ability to make the firm 
as profitable as possible.  
 
The social connections are of course not neglected in IOFs but they are subordinate to the 
financial demands. There must be good social relations within the management team but this 
is so because thereby a better capital return could be attained – an atmosphere of conflicts 
would be disastrous. Hence, the social capital within IOFs is attained with the help of 
financial capital. The employees should be satisfied with their jobs, but that is obtained with 
the help of good salaries and a good social climate on the working place. The consumers 
should be as loyal as possible to the firm, which means that marketing communication is 
important.  
 
3.4. The mechanisms behind the decline of social capital in cooperatives 
The demise of many cooperative firms is related to dissatisfaction among the members 
(Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009). The cooperatives can no longer meet the members’ 
demands, and therefore the members increasingly abandon the cooperatives. Thereby the 
cooperatives get a lower volume to process and consequently they are facing low capacity 
utilization, which is costly. When members are leaving the cooperatives, their allocated 
capital is redeemed, whereby the cooperatives’ capital basis is weakened. As members get 
dissatisfied they also ignore taking part in the governance of the cooperatives, which is to say 
that the cooperative will to an even less extent work in the interests of the members. It can be 
seen that there are vicious circles, i.e. the more members who get dissatisfied the poorer 
conditions will the cooperatives offer the remaining members who then become more inclined 
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to leave the cooperatives (cf. so-called “bank runs”). When member dissatisfaction has 
reached a certain point, it is difficult to change the development.  
 
A driving factor is that the intensity of competition has increased (Boehlje, Akridge and 
Downey, 1995). One reason behind this development is the increasing degree of 
industrialization in primary agriculture, following the introduction of new production 
technologies and new governance models. The owners and managers of the very large farms 
do not have the same sense of cooperative belongingness as farmers used to have, and the size 
of their farming operations imply that they do not have a strong need to reduce their 
transaction costs by the help of cooperative firms (Ollila, 1989). As the markets nowadays 
function better the relative advantage of cooperatives has decreased (Harte, 1997). 
 
In order to maintain competitiveness on the increasingly competitive markets the cooperatives 
are integrating vertically (forwards) towards the more lucrative and less price sensitive 
consumer goods markets where there are greater possibilities for product differentiation and 
market segmentation. Likewise they integrate horizontally, mainly through mergers (Van der 
Krogt, Nilsson and Høst, 2007). Large size is positive for the attainment of lower average 
costs through economies of scale as well as economies of scope.  
 
Especially the strategy of vertical integration is resource demanding, i.e. the cooperatives 
need more capital, and the capital must ultimately originate from the members. The farmer-
members are, however, reluctant to supply more capital to the cooperatives (Chaddad, 2001; 
Richards and Manfredo, 2003). They have better investment opportunities in their own 
farming operation. Hence, the cooperatives tend to be undercapitalized.  
 
Another characteristic of cooperatives is often said to be risk aversion (Staatz, 1987; 
Hendrikse, 1998). The members do not invest in their cooperatives to take high risks – on the 
contrary, they involve themselves in order to reduce the risk level in their farming operations. 
Nevertheless, the cooperatives are taking large risks when following strategies of vertical and 
horizontal integration, especially as their amount of equity capital is most often limited.  
 
Moreover, in order to be competitive the cooperatives are trying to streamline their business 
operations. This implies that they must have more control of the inputs from the members. 
The members do, however, not want to be controlled. Hence, the members become more 
negative towards their cooperatives (Hogeland, 2006). When the cooperative movement 
started the members took this initiative in order to get a protection from the “evil” market 
forces and to remain as independent farm businessmen. Today, the relationship has often been 
reversed.  
 
The trend towards horizontal integration (large-scale operations) tends to create memberships, 
which are very large and heterogeneous. Most extreme are the transnational cooperatives, 
having members in two or more countries (Nilsson and Madsen, 2007). As a consequence the 
members feel more and more alienated (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009; Österberg and 
Nilsson, 2009). The management becomes increasingly autonomous, and the members have 
limited influence in the cooperatives’ decision making (Hind, 1997; Hind, 1999).  
 
The development described above indicates that many present-day agricultural cooperatives 
do not operate in ways that this organizational type was built for a hundred years or more ago. 
They neglect the fact that the cooperatives business form is a social construction, which 
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humans have built up in order to get specific problems solved. They seem to believe that the 
cooperative business form can do all that investor-owned firms do.  
 
There is a divergence between the attributes of cooperative business and the strategies that 
these firms pursue (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007; Nilsson and Ollila, 2009). The strategies of 
vertical and horizontal integration are a way to adapt to the developing market situation, but 
such market orientation is at odds with the member orientation, which is necessary for 
cooperatives. There would probably be other markets for the cooperatives to adapt to – 
markets which the members know and understand and which they are willing to raise capital 
for. These observations indicate that the failing cooperatives are characterized by an 
imbalanced relationship between the financial capital and the social capital.  
 
 
4. Shrinking social capital in cooperatives 
 
4.1. Literature review 
Even though researchers base their explanations of cooperative problems on various other 
theoretical bases it is easy to identify social capital elements in their explanations. Hence, one 
may claim that the social capital paradigm is the common denominator for all the 
explanations, which are presented below. 
 
Cook (1995) suggests a five-step life-cycle model for cooperatives, ranging from 
establishment to either exiting, restructuring (including choosing a hybrid model, and 
involving outside co-owners), or shifting (choosing an individualized cooperative model, 
implying tradable delivery rights). Before the final step is reached the cooperatives are 
plagued with problems, originating from so-called vaguely defined property rights (VDPR). 
One such problem is that the members do no longer want to finance the cooperatives; another 
one that the cooperatives make investments that are not in the interests of all farmers; 
furthermore, members do not monitor the cooperatives thereby handing over the power to the 
professional managers. These and other VDPR problems follow as the membership becomes 
so large and anonymous that the members have a tendency to be free riders, the cooperatives 
business activities expand beyond the horizons of the farmers, the ownership is to a large 
extent collective – all in all, the amount of social capital that the cooperative has in the minds 
of the members is shrinking.  
 
Fulton (1995), with the use of property rights theory, suggests that the cooperatives have lost 
their former capacity of being the most crucial link in the value chains. Historically farmer 
cooperatives were superior as concerns the production of large and homogeneous volumes of 
high quality agricultural products. This was a consequence of the fact that farmers had trust in 
their cooperatives whereby they were willing to accept the superiority of the cooperative. 
Søgaard (1994) supports this kind of reasoning. Today, however, investor-owned competitors 
have developed techniques for acquiring the same ends, whereby the power has shifted to 
other links in the value chain, predominantly the retailers and the firms owning the genetic 
material. The value of the farmers’ trust in their cooperatives has been devaluated.  
 
According to Bager (1996), cooperatives constitute one group in the population of formal 
organizations within an economy and an industry. In the infancy of cooperatives, the number 
of cooperatives was so large that they formed a tightly connected group, and hence there was 
“mimetic isomorphism”, such that the cooperatives tended to become similar to one another 
and dissimilar to other business firms. In those days there was a substantial amount of social 
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capital. Today, techno-economic and institutional changes have resulted in large-scale 
cooperatives, operating internationally. Thereby the cooperatives are subject to “noncongruent 
isomorphic pressures”, driving them to adapt to the practices of IOFs. The farmers have social 
networks not only with other farmers but also with non-farmers. The employees have 
investor-owned firms (IOFs) as their optional employers, and so have the managers and even 
the chief executive officers (CEOs). Most suppliers to the cooperatives are IOFs, and so are 
their customers. The financial institutions treat cooperatives as they treat IOFs. Hence there is 
not room for very much of social capital.  
 
It is generally held that cooperatives are established when a group of economic actors 
perceive that they can reduce their transaction costs with the help of a jointly owned agent. A 
condition is that the group of actors has reasonably low costs for organizing this firm. These 
conditions are, however, not as strong today as they used to be (Harte, 1997). The farmers’ 
potential for transaction cost reduction is less due to the modern information technology as 
well as better transport technologies. Today’s farmers are much larger and much more 
specialized than previous generations, and thereby they are stronger when they are to act on 
the open markets. Farming has become a profession like all others, which is to say that 
farmers’ age-old self-identity has begun to vanish.  
 
Hind states that “cooperatives become more corporate oriented as they develop through time” 
(1997:1081) and that “in the later stages of the life cycle, the aspirations of the managers, 
rather than those of the farmers, are realised” (1999: 536). This is an expression of less social 
capital.  
 
Holmström (1999) is one of the many researchers who criticize cooperatives on the basis of 
corporate governance, including poor leadership, poor capital building capacity and poor 
investments. The core of his criticism is that there is no market for equity capital and hence 
cooperative decision-makers can not know whether the amount of capital is too large or too 
small or whether an investment is worth conducting.  
 
Lang (2006) used dominant logic theory and principal-agent theory to investigate the reasons 
for the transition of Canada’s largest agricultural cooperative. She found that the cooperative 
was not able to change its existing business logic when the competitive pressure increased. 
She reports that “management took advantage of the board’s lack of experience as 
investments extended beyond the farm gate. The principal-agent problem in conjunction with 
an inaccurate revised dominant logic is the reasonable explanation for the Pool’s failure! 
(Lang, 2006: iii.). In other words, there was not enough social capital among the members nor 
the directors to monitor the management.  
 
There has according to Hogeland (2006) been a cultural transition in the agricultural 
cooperatives. Towards the end of the 20th century the cooperatives became very large and 
their operations became increasingly complex. Hence there was a need for highly professional 
management. Producer commitment and control should be reconciled with efficiency and 
competitiveness, ultimately resulting in vertical integration. Hence, a dilemma arose: 
“Cooperatives are the institution that provides ‛the common man’, that is, the small farmer, 
equality in the marketplace. The critical issue was whether producer equality was maintained 
by keeping cooperatives small and participatory or commensurate in size, scale, and vision 
with the large businesses that threatened to overpower farmers in the marketplace” (Hogeland 
2006: 71). As a result, producer commitment and influence gave way to nonfarm investments 
in a “cultural transformation that weakened the symbiotic relationship between farm and 
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cooperative” (Hogeland 2006: 77). The culture that is supportive for the traditionally 
organized cooperatives becomes successively threatened as the cooperatives expand. 
“Farmers wanted to use cooperatives to protect their economic independence, but 
cooperatives needed farmers to be economically dependent on them” (Hogeland, 2006: 67-
68).  
 
Fulton and Hueth (2009) claim that the problems of the cooperatives is due to poor 
management, but if so also the boards of directors must be blamed and ultimately the 
members, who have elected not good enough directors. There are also “common structural 
problems associated with cooperatives – such as lack of capital, property right problems and 
portfolio problems” (Fulton and Hueth, 2009: i). 
 
The observations above are not new. Many decades ago Bakken and Schaars (1937: 533) 
stated that “Cooperative organizations are occasionally alluded to as self-liquidating 
corporations. Their success may cause their destruction”. A similar observation is made by 
LeVay (1986: 108–109.) 
 
4.2. Social capital in the decision-making process  
An explanation to the development may be that social capital hitherto has not been 
acknowledged as capital neither among researchers or the cooperative decision-makers. The 
ignorance of this intangible capital in economists’ analyses was first observed by Bourdieu 
(1986). In particular it is striking that cooperative enterprises – supposedly the social capital 
driven enterprises par excellence – have not taken the reduction of social capital into account 
as a probable and significant cost as the strategies towards vertical and horizontal integration 
have been pursued.  
 
Prior researchers have only indirectly alluded to social capital as the “missing link” in 
understanding the economic performance of traditional cooperatives. They have not used the 
concept capital and, hence, not explicitly included it in the accounts. Although social capital 
is not easy to measure (the typical measure being the level of trust) it should have been 
included in the calculations. As Hogeland (2006) indicates without applying the term social 
capital, social networks based on norms of reciprocity and trust can be seen as the value-
added asset of cooperatives, in comparison with competing types of enterprises (as e.g. IOFs). 
In such a perspective, social relations within a firm should not just be assessed as a more or 
less random configuration of human beings but as a concrete resource, the productivity of 
which depends on the organizational form. Indeed, cooperatives need social capital in order to 
be competitive. Therefore, the drain of formerly high stocks of social capital may be an 
explanation of the crisis that many traditional cooperatives have experienced recently. 
 
Within a cooperative, there is a trade-off between financial capital needed for vertical and 
horizontal integration on the one hand, and its stock of social capital on the other. If a 
cooperative is not aware of its comparative advantage in terms of social capital, and therefore 
does not protect it, it risks losing this form of capital in the process of developing into a large-
scale enterprise. Consequently, profits from economies of scale and scope may be out-
weighed by loss of social capital mirrored in less trust among members and between members 
and leaders, alienation and passivity among members, low involvement, less democratic 
governance, private good provision rather than collective good provision, widespread free-
riding, low satisfaction and loss of solidarity. This is not to say that strategies of vertical and 
horizontal integration are ‘wrong’ for cooperative enterprises but it should be realized that 
these strategies have costs which may not always be visible to the eye (and to the accountant) 
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but which nevertheless have an impact on the cooperative’s economic performance, because 
these decisions involve a drain of social capital.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the development towards weaker social capital in the relationships 
between the members as well as between the members and the cooperative firm should not 
have come as a surprise to the cooperatives’ decision-makers, i.e. the board and the top 
management. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
These decision-makers have made decisions, which have been wise and well deliberated at 
the time of the decision-making. There are, however, a few problems associated with such 
decision-making:  
 
Time horizons. The decisions were made on the basis of calculation concerning costs and 
revenues, i.e. they concerned the financial consequences that could be foreseen in a 
reasonably long time perspective. The effects that the various decisions may have in a longer 
time perspective were probably not considered. This is especially so as all decision-makers 
have limited time horizons as well, i.e. they are elected or appointed for a few years only.  
 
Delayed effects. The reduction of the social capital cannot be seen within next few years after 
the cooperatives’ investment decisions are made. It may take several years until the members 
realize that the cooperative does no longer work in their best interests.  
 
Incrementality. The negative effects that the cooperatives’ decision-making may have on the 
level of social capital take place incrementally. As the change takes place in many small steps, 
the decision-makers have no possibility to link the two to each other. On the contrary, the 
decision-makers are more likely never to realize that strategies of horizontal and vertical 
integration have anything to do with shrinking social capital.  
 
Measurability. It is impossible to measure and quantify the amount of social capital within a 
cooperative membership, at least for the decision-makers. What is impossible to discern does 
not exist in the minds of the decision-makers.  
 
Populism. The decision-makers – especially the directors – want to be popular among the 
membership, and therefore they make decisions, which they can successfully explain to the 
members. It is easier to provide explanations about factual considerations rather than 
explaining diffuse social conditions.  
 
4.3. Vaguely defined property rights in traditional cooperatives 
Many of the researchers who explain the demise of traditional cooperatives argue that the fact 
that the property rights are not specified bare a large part of the blame. Cooperatives have so-
called “cooperative property rights”, which imply that there is no market for the shares 
(Vitaliano, 1983).  
 
In the early days of the cooperative movement the vaguely defined property rights did, 
however, not pose any problem. Those cooperatives – just as many of today’s small 
cooperatives – had the same “cooperative property rights”. The conditions were quite 
different from those that characterize the present-day cooperatives with large and 
differentiated business operations and large and heterogeneous memberships.  
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Table 1 presents a comparison between cooperatives that are large and complex (extensive 
horizontal and vertical integration) and those which are small and simple (only member-
related operations). It shows that the problems of vaguely defined property rights may be 
large in the former category but small in the latter. In the latter category there are good 
conditions for a large stock of social capital as the members to a great extent know each other, 
have an overview of the cooperatives business operations and have relationships with the 
leading decision-makers. The opposite holds true in the large and complex cooperatives.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
4.4. Model of the co-operative demises  
Next step is to develop a model of the co-operative demises. The tool used for this analysis is 
a development of the consumer choice model, well-known in the neo-classical economic 
theory. Hence the graphical illustrations consist of indifference curves and budget constraint 
curves. The following presentation does, however, not concern consumers who are trying to 
allocate their budgets on consumption alternatives in an optimal way. We are dealing with 
cooperative and investor-owned firms that use budgets consisting of social and financial 
capital for performing various business activities in an optimal way, given that these activities 
require different sets of capital.  
 
All activities to be performed need the use of different types of capital. Capital is here 
classified as financial capital and social capital – human capital, physical capital and others 
are left outside. The activity may be the establishment of a factory, the leadership of a firm, 
control of a management, investment in new products or new markets, etc. It is evident that 
these activities require financial capital, i.e. investments for the construction of buildings, 
purchase of machinery, employment of staff, conducting research, etc. At the same time social 
capital is necessary, otherwise the employees will not be motivated to work efficiently, the 
management group will not unite about decisions, collective action problems will arise, the 
buyers will not have enough trust in the firm to buy its products, investors do no dare to invest 
in the firm, etc. Hence, both types of capital are needed all the time, no matter what task is to 
be performed.  
 
The two types of capital may, however, be deployed in various proportions. It is possible to 
exchange one for another, though not completely so – only to some but not specified extent. A 
firm may use little financial capital for advertising campaigns, relying more on the word-of-
mouth communication among its circle of customers. A firm may employ a promising person 
at a relatively low salary, provided that this person is proud of working for a well-reputed 
firm. The CEO (Chief Executive Officer) may get relatively poor investment proposals 
accepted by the Board of Directors if she or he is highly esteemed by the directors. It may be 
possible to get customers to conduct certain kinds of services for free or the same services 
could be bought from the market.  
 
Hence, the two types of capital may be transformed, or ‘converted’ (Bourdieu, 1986), from 
one to another. In other words, it is possible to ‘buy’ one type of capital by ‘paying’ with the 
other type of capital.  
 
This reasoning is illustrated in Figure 2. The curves a and b stand for activities, which demand 
different amounts of total capital. Activity a requires a larger amount of capital while activity 
b requires less capital. On curve a, two situations are marked, saying that this activity can be 
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executed with either a large amount of social capital and less financial capital (s1;f1) or the 
other way around (s2,f2). 
 
The curves approach the axes asymptotically but they do never cross any of the axes. This 
means that both types of capital are needed no matter which the activity is. It is seen that a 
firm will suffer from large costs if one of the capital types is very scarce. In order to balance a 
very small amount of social capital the firm has to use an extremely large amount of financial 
capital, and vice versa. 
 
The proportion of the two types of capital, needed for a specific purpose, is contingent on the 
firm’s costs for obtaining financial capital versus obtaining social capital. As the curves in 
Figure 2 are fairly curvilinear, the transformation is quite unequal, i.e. the actor must give 
away a large amount of financial capital in order to get a limited amount of social capital, and 
vice versa. If the curves were straighter, the two types of capital were valued more equally. 
The last option, i.e. if the curves had a convex shape instead of the concave shape as in Figure 
2, would be impossible just as a completely straight line is. In both occasions, the curves 
would cross the axes. 
 
The curves in Figure 3 express the amount of capital that a firm has available for conducting a 
specific activity, i.e. they are the budget restrictions for firms A and B. As there are limits as 
to how much capital the firm has, these curves are crossing the axes.  
 
The capital that an actor has can be transformed from one capital type to another. It is possible 
to buy social capital by paying with financial capital and vice versa. Figure 3 shows two cases 
for actor A. When such transformations are made, there are costs associated with the 
transformation itself, i.e. transaction costs. These are, however, not included in this analysis. 
 
Again the budget restriction curves may have different shapes, depending on which ‘exchange 
rates’ there are for the firms wishing to transform one type of capital into the other. These 
curves may in principle also be straight lines, which would mean that both types of capital 
were valued just as much when the firms are to make the transformations. If so, the firm 
would get one unit of social capital by paying with one unit of financial capital and vice versa 
(if the two capital types were to be measured in one way or another). This would, however, 
not be found in reality.  
 
For example a social movement has plenty of social capital but little financial capital. This 
social movement needs financial capital in order to conduct activities for its members, but the 
sacrifices for getting this financial capital are large. Members may have to engage in charity, 
for example. Correspondingly a business firm, based on financial capital, needs social capital 
for motivating its staff to work efficiently, but it has to pay an amount of financial capital as 
salaries and fringe benefits to acquire this.  
 
Figure 4 is an amalgamation of Figures 2 and 3. Hence, it shows the optimal solution when 
firms A and B are to perform activity a and b using their respective sets, or configurations, of 
social and financial capital. The figure shows the optimal use of the two forms of capital for 
both actors. Actor A, who has more total capital (or capital volume, cf. Bourdieu 1989), can 
perform activity a by deploying social and financial capital in proportions s1 and f1. This 
combination is optimal. Why? Simply because with any other combination of social and 
financial capital firm A would not be able to conduct the activity a. Or, at least, firm A would 
have to use a much larger amount of resources for activity a.  
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The curves in Figures 2, 3 and 4 are mirrored, i.e. equal along both axes. This is an unlikely 
situation. Normally the curves are leaning towards one or the other of the two axes depending 
on the type of activity and the resource base that the actor has. Some activities require that 
more social capital is deployed, while others require more financial capital. This situation is 
shown in figure 5. Here the curves for needed capital are skewed.  
 
In Figure 5 four curves are depicted, two of them for activities which can be formed with 
much social capital, denoted Act (social); and two which are best performed with financial 
capital, denoted Act (financial). This depends on the type of activity, i.e. what is to be 
performed with which outcome. If, for example, the activity is to convince a group of 
individuals to do something, one may use arguments (social capital) or pay them for doing 
this (financial capital), but the former option will probably require a smaller amount of total 
capital. This may be the curves Act (social). If, on the other hand, the task is to produce a 
physical good, financial capital might be more efficient that social capital, as is shown in the 
curves Act (social). 
 
Similarly, the curves in Figure 6 are skewed. This is so because the ability to raise capital of 
the two kinds depends on the type of firm. Two types of firms are considered. Cooperative 
firms are based on strong social relationships between the members and the members’ trust in 
each other (horizontally, or ‘bridging’ social capital) and in the leadership (vertically, or 
‘linking’ social capital). Hence, a co-operative has better access to social capital than an 
investor-owned firm. Investor-owned firms are likely to have owners who are anonymous to 
one another, i.e. there is no social glue. On the other hand the owners are owners because they 
invest financial capital.  
 
Figure 7 combines figures 5 and 6. In this figure, only the two curves for activities, which 
require much financial capital, are included. This is so to demonstrate that cooperatives, with 
their (historic) prevalence of social capital, are hampered in such an environment. It appears 
from Figure 7 that in order to perform activity 1, the co-operatives’ optimal solution is to 
deploy the amount of capital in Co-op2, which results in the combination x1 and y1. The 
investor-owned firm can perform the same activity with the use of the totalcapital amount 
contained in IOF1, provided that capital is used in the proportions x2 and y2. However, the 
investor-owned firm’s totalcapital in IOF1 is smaller than the cooperative’s totalcapital Co-
op2, which gives the investor-owned firm a competitive advantage over the cooperative. If the 
investor-owned firm was able to use the same total amount of capital as the cooperative does, 
this investor-owned firm would be able to perform activity2. The co-operative does not have 
any ability to handle activity2.  
 
In case the activity would have been of a kind that is well suited for social capital, the 
cooperative would have been better-off than the investor-owned firm. This model for potential 
cooperative demises is depicted in Figure 7, but it is easy to understand as in that case the 
curves would be the opposite.  
 
A traditionally organized co-operative is – and especially was – a grass-root organization. 
Individuals gathered to pool the few resources they had, which is to say that they knew each 
other, had trust in one another and were determined to, and able to, work together – that is, the 
‘poor man’s capital’ so to speak. In this way social capital became the hard rock on which 
these co-operatives were built. The opposite holds true for the investor-owned firms. The 
investors have normally no social relations. People who are anonymous to one another invest 
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financial capital for the sake of getting capital returns. The social activities characterised co-
operative enterprises in their inception and childhood. The members of those days invested in 
low-cost equipment for the very first stages of the processing chain. Economic activities are 
such where the entrepreneurs invest in order to get capital returns and hence they normally 
invest so as to differentiate themselves from the competitors, i.e. the amount of capital is 
normally larger.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Why have cooperatives changed business form in recent time? This study overall suggested 
that a coherent social capital theoretical framework may contribute to explain why many of 
the large and complex traditionally organized, agricultural cooperatives have failed during the 
last couple of decades. The strategies towards far-reaching vertical integration and horizontal 
integration have created a gorge between the members and their cooperatives, which until 
recently have been extremely rich on this particular form of capital. This has led to less 
mutual trust and less face-face interaction between ordinary members, as well as between 
members and leaders, implying less engagement among members, less pride of one’s 
cooperative, less democratic governance, more difficulties in solving various collective action 
dilemmas (and, perhaps, more control as a consequence) and, ultimately, bad reputation 
among investors and consumers. Hence, for obvious reasons the withering of ‘soft’ values 
contained in a social capital has serious impact on these enterprises’ economic performance.  
 
This does, however, not mean that the cooperatives should not follow such strategies. The 
changing markets very often require value-added processing of the agricultural products. 
Without such expansion the cooperatives would probably not be competitive enough.  
 
This is also to say that the decision-makers cannot be blamed for the development. They have 
done what was necessary to do at the time of the decision-making. The development is a 
consequence of the increasing large scale of agricultural enterprises, the intensified 
competition due to the process of globalization and technological advances.  
 
Crucial for present and future decisions on business form is, however, that cooperative 
leaderships are fully aware of any potential loss or gain in social capital when changing the 
status quo of coops that historically have been exceptionally rich on this particular form of 
capital. As it is, cooperatives’ decision-makers have no instruments for estimating how much 
social capital is lost when they pursue strategies of vertical and horizontal integration and 
therefore they do not consider this potential loss or gain in terms of social capital in their 
calculations. Thus, future research should try to establish adequate instruments for estimating 
the level of social capital within an organization such as a cooperative enterprise so that this 
value added is also taken into account in any cost-benefit analysis. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: The problems of vaguely defined property rights in cooperatives with varying degrees of 
vertical and horizontal integration 
Traditional cooperative with far-
reaching vertical and horizontal 
integration 
Traditional cooperative operating only in member-
related businesses 
The free-rider problem 
In a large membership where members 
are anonymous to each other, each 
individual may think that something 
wrong is happening and that somebody 
has to take action, but “somebody else” 
should do that. Free riding may be seen 
also as the individuals’ investment 
behavior, Furthermore, members may 
understand that the cooperative’s 
survival may be threatened by a reduced 
volume but each of them say that others 
should be more loyal, not themselves. 
 
A homogeneous membership and small joint assets imply 
low free-rider problems. A new member benefits from the 
firm’s existing assets, but the existing members may gain 
from letting new ones to join freely. Thanks to the new 
member the volume increases, whereby economies of scale 
can be reaped. When members withdraw, they cannot take 
with them the wealth to which they have contributed 
during their period of membership, but they have still 
benefited from their membership in terms of favourable 
market exchanges. Further, a co-operative that operates 
solely with ameliorating badly functioning markets will 
have limited capital so the withdrawing member will lose 
only a small amount.  
The horizon problem 
It can not be excluded that the members 
understand that the cooperatives’ 
cooperative status is threatened but they 
might think that this does not matter 
very much as the problems will not be 
really serious until the specific member 
has retired.  
 
Due to a homogeneous membership and a low level of 
investments, the efficiency losses resulting from the 
horizon problem may be overshadowed by the fact that 
members enjoy better functioning markets during their 
period of membership. In addition, the homogeneous 
membership includes strong social and economic 
interdependencies, whereby members tend to have longer 
time horizons. Members’ utility-maximising behaviour can 
therefore reach beyond a person’s own lifetime.  
If the co-operative works only with member-related 
activities it is likely that its undertakings will consist of 
simple and stable business functions. Such activities 
change so little over time that the horizon problem 
declines.  
The portfolio problem. 
With a large and heterogeneous 
membership and with diversified and 
complex business operations the 
cooperative makes many investments 
which are not in the best interests of all 
members. This may not only create 
conflicts within the membership, but it 
may also give rise to dissatisfaction and 
alienation.  
 
If a co-operative’s operations strengthen the members’ 
market position and there is trust between the members, 
the portfolio problem is less potent. If the membership is 
homogeneous and if the co-operative firm operates only in 
the problematic market, all the members will benefit from 
all the investments and operations in the firm. The firm is 
not engaged in diversified activities. The activities of the 
firm are straightforward, becoming less capital-intensive 
and stable over the years. Hence, it does not matter very 
much that the unallocated capital is inflexible or that 
owner-shares are not transferable. 
The monitoring problems 
As members are anonymous to each 
other they remain passive even though 
they are aware of the rising problems of 
the cooperatives. The individual does 
not know what is happening, has weak 
incentives to take action and does not 
want to use his or her own resources to 
organize a resistance movement.  
 
Neither the follow-up problem nor the decision-making 
problem is significant under the high member-commitment 
that is likely if the membership is homogeneous and the 
co-operative is successful in correcting the market failures 
that the members may face. The proceeds from the 
member’s investments are in the form of improved trading 
conditions, whereby their investments result in positive 
gains.  
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Figure 1: Economies of scale in traditional cooperative enterprises: Outcrowding social 
capital and lowering economic performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T1 = Economies of scale leading to increased economic performance without drain of social capital 
T2 = Economies of scale leading to high economic performance without any significant drain of social capital 
T3 = Economies of scale leading to stagnated economic performance with increased drain of social capital 
T4 = Economies of scale leading to lowered economic performance due to significant drain of social capital 
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Figure 2. Transformation of capital needed for performing activities. 
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Figure 3: Amount of capital available for an actor to perform various activities. 
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Figure 4: Optimal use of capital by an actor performing various activities. 
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Figure 5: Transformation of capital needed for performing activities that require different 
combinations of financial and social capital. 
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Figure 6: Cooperatives’ and investor-owned firms’ sets of social and financial capital. 
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Figure 7: Cooperatives’ and IOFs’ optimal use of capital for conducting activities, which are 
best conducted with financial capital. 
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